This paper highlights the corporate governance of financial institutions with particular reference to banking sector of Bangladesh. The importance of corporate governance of banks remains crucial given their contribution in economic growth through financial development. This paper has shed light on the structures of corporate governance of banks in Bangladesh involving their ownership structure, board issues, executive aspects, disclosure, and audit practices along with their associated weaknesses. The paper has also showed how political interference and failure by the regulators has contributed to the governance problems in the banks.
INTRODUCTION
Globalization of financial markets and fears of financial instability have brought the issue of the corporate governance into forefront of the policy discussions. In an increasingly deregulated policy environment, the big corporate failures such as Enron, Vivendi, Barrings have raised the need for implementing competent corporate governance practices. The recent financial crises in different countries have verified how the lack of good governance practices in the financial institutions can lead to a crisis in the system leaving long-term consequences to the economy (Singh and Weisse, 2002; Mitton, 2001) . Among the financial institutions, the corporate governance of banks has received very little attention only (Arun and Turner, 2003) . In developing countries, banks have a dominant position in the financial systems and a discussion on corporate governance of banks required special attention. This paper addresses the corporate governance of banking sector in the context of Bangladesh.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BANKING INSTITUTIONS
The need for a competent financial sector is important to stimulate and support economic growth through efficient resource allocation. The financial system also enhances growth by pooling risks and facilitating transactions (World Bank, 1989) . The role of financial sector in economic growth is even greater in developing countries as their tolerable margin of errors in resource allocation is small 1 . Different cross-country studies support the idea that countries with efficient and strong financial markets experience higher rates of economic growth. Some studies have also found the strong evidence of relationship between the size and operation of financial markets and/or the development and structure of banking sector and economic growth (King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1999; Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001) The number of bank failures and financial crises during the last two decades raises questions on the competency of the governance practices of the banking system. The undesirable banking practices such as poor risk diversification, inadequate loan evaluation, fraudulent activities were as much responsible as other macroeconomic factors in causing banking crises which shook the financial systems of countries such as Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, Philippines, Spain, Thailand etc (Sundararajan and Balino, 1991) . Winkler (1998) insists that the quality of corporate governance of banking institutions determines the success of the financial development.
Absence of proper monitoring and control mechanism cripples the potential good effect of financial development on the economic growth. The fact that banking companies are allowed to collect deposit and utilize them for profit making activities, could create opportunities of moral hazards 2 . The possibility/motivation of plundering depositor's money, who happens to be the primary principal in banking companies, by the agents is greater in banking companies as the agents who founded the bank had to contribute very little through equity in accumulating the assets. One reason why banking stimulates financial development is that people entrust the banks with their deposits as the banks are expected to carefully select investment opportunities and then prudently monitor the loan borrowers which could have controlled the problems associated with information asymmetry. However, in reality the agents may not be selecting and monitoring the loans, particularly when the loans are connected to agents and their beneficiaries. The implementation of sound governance mechanisms could reduce the risk of moral hazards and enhances the process of financial development.
Banking companies pose unique corporate governance attention as they differ greatly with other types of firms in terms of broader extent of claimants on the banks assets and funds. A group of entrepreneurs and/or executives could set up a banking business by putting very little equity from their own pocket as the nature of business itself guarantees flow of enormous amount of funds in the form of deposits. The general approach to corporate governance argue in favor of the shareholders rights only, as managers/executives may not always work in the best interest of the shareholders (Henderson, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983) . But the shareholders actually account for a very tiny portion of the bank's assets and funds. Rather almost every bit of banks' investments are financed by the depositors' funds.
In case of losses or failures it will be depositors' savings that the banks would lose. Such risks demand priority in protection of depositors that ushers in a broader view of corporate governance that suggests the interest and benefits of the suppliers of funds for a firm should be upheld (Shliefer and Vishny, 1997; Vives, 2000; Oman, 2001) . Macey and O'Hara (2001) also argue that a broader view of corporate governance should be adopted in the case of banking institutions, arguing that because of the peculiar contractual form of banking, corporate governance mechanisms for banks should encapsulate depositors as well as share holders. Arun and Turner (2003) supported the need for the broader approach to corporate governance for banking institutions and also argue for government intervention to restrain the behavior of bank management.
In many countries, deposit insurance is used as a mechanism to safeguard the banking system as well as the depositors. However, Macey and O'Hara (2001) argues that in many instances, the presence of deposit insurance mechanism by the governments may encourage many bank insiders to embark upon self-benefiting risky deals taking the advantage of insurance protection. The self-dealing activities by the bank insiders are very dangerous to the performance and survival of the banks as scores of previous bank failures have been caused by risky self-dealing by the bank insiders (Jackson and Symons, 1999; Clarke, 1988) . The presence of heavy liquid assets and potential lack of depositors' interest to actively control and monitor banks' risky decisions as a result of the insurance guarantees simplifies and aggravates the sharking in the banking firms.
Banks in developing countries are faced with high risk of sharking as a result of heavy government ownership, lack of prudential regulation, weak legal protection and presence of special interest groups ((BCBS, 1999; Arun and Turner, 2003) . The independent regulatory agencies are important in developing countries to act against the frequent collusion among government, businesses and bankers to serve special interest groups (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Arun and Turner, 2002) . However, there is an argument that active role by regulators may cause problems as well, as regulators may not have a convincing/sufficient motivation to monitor the banks as they do not have much at stake in case of bank failures (Macey and Garrett, 1988) . Recently, the financial markets of developing economies have experienced rapid changes due to the growth of wider range of financial products. As a result of this, banks have been involved with high risk activities such as trading in financial markets and different offbalance sheet activities more than ever before (Greuning and Bratanovic, 2003) , which necessitates an added emphasis on quality of corporate governance of banks in developing economies. Despite the expansion, the operational efficiency of the banking institutions has continued to be dismal (Sayeed, 2002; Raquib, 1999) . The sector witnessed decreasing profitability, increasing non-performing assets, provision and capital shortfalls, eroded credit discipline, rampant corruption patronized by political quarters, low recovery rate, inferior asset quality, managerial weaknesses, excessive interference from government and owners, weak regulatory and supervisory role etc (Hassan, 1994; USAID, 1995) . Internal control system along with accounting and audit qualities are believed to have been substandard (World Bank, 1998; Raquib, 1999; CPD, 2001 ). Many of the problems have been attributed to lack of sound corporate governance among the banks. The reports by the Banking Reform Commission (1999) and BEI (2003) raises serious concerns on the banking sector and criticize the quality of governance that prevails in the banking sector in Bangladesh, which provides an impetus to explore the governance issues in detail in this paper.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BANKING SECTOR IN BANGLADESH
As in many other countries, there were no available structured databases on corporate governance in Bangladesh that led us to the obvious choice of generating data through a structured survey of banking institutions in the country. The structured questionnaire survey aimed at finding out the prevailing situation in the banking sector with respect to the core elements of corporate governance such as ownership/shareholding structure, control of firms, board issues, management contracts and compensation, audit and disclosure. Because of close geographical proximity, the entire banking (49) and institutions. However, the banking law prohibits shareholding of more than 10 per cent by members of one family 6 . The survey has noticed heavy presence of block holders in the banking sector 7 , and the overwhelming majority of these block holders are from the sponsors' category.
The issue of sponsors as a single interest group requires further analysis. This is due to the fact that the lead sponsor, who normally after getting political assurance of being awarded banking license, assembles ten 8 or more sponsors from his/her family, relatives and business and social The issue of large shareholders discussed in section 3.1 becomes more prominent due to the total domination by those shareholders in the boards of the banks in Bangladesh. In the PCBs nine out of the 10 members of the boards are shareholder directors. The other rest goes mainly to the CEOs as the law requires them to be in the board. The entire private banking has only two independent directors. So it's not difficult for one to understand who controls the boards in PCBs in Bangladesh banking. And according to the banking law as well corporate by-laws, it's basically the board which takes majority of the decision regarding banks operations including loans, investments, appointments, audits etc. The corporate by-laws of most of the banks restrict entry of one to the bank's boards if he/she is not a sponsor shareholder. And the sponsors left no stones unturned in taking full advantage of their total reign in the bank boards that decide almost everything about those banks. In the public sector banks the boards are comprised of politically appointed independent directors who are put in those positions by the ruling politicians with special instruction and objectives to serve the purposes of special quarters involving politicians and business houses. And with government's total and unchallengeable authority to remove any director any time coupled with the directors' political loyalty, boards in these public sector banks continue to serve the politicians as 'Rubber Stamps'. The FCBs boards are however completely comprised of the executives who are accountable to senior regional and global managers. And these board members happen to work with full autonomy and usually work very professionally.
Management, Contracts and Incentives
The owners of the banks heavily control the management activities in Bangladesh. The shareholders, either directly in case of public sector banks, or through boards as in cases of the private banks, have total control on the fate of the executives. In 82 per cent of the banks, the CEOs are directly accountable to the boards and for the others it's mostly the owners directly except for few foreign banks where accountability is to the seniors in the global chain.
The contract that dictates the managements' contribution to the banks' benefits seem to be fine The executives are also more qualified than those of public sector's in terms of both profession and education. Also given the market conditions in Bangladesh, the executives of the private banks are very well paid in fact they are the highest paid executives among any Bangladeshi companies. The partial accountability along with sufficient motivational packages make the executives work hard for the betterment of the banks and its depositors and shareholders.
Though the FCBs executives do not have any direct supervision of the owners, they work under a very well designed and strict accountability system. Also they are very highly qualified professionals getting extremely attractive benefits. The FCBs executives are in fact highest paid of any type of company executives in Bangladesh. Additional financial incentives and advancement in career has been linked to their and the banks' performance. All of these actually make them work very hard for the profitability of the banks that ultimately takes good care of the depositors' funds they are entrusted with.
Audit and Disclosure Findings
Proper and effective audit coupled with full and right disclosure helps to maintain accountability and bring transparency of firms. For banking companies, which collect people's money and make profit by investing those funds require more stringent audit and disclosure practices than non-financial firms. Here is how the audit and disclosure is like in the banking sector of However, only 5 per cent of the banks said they disclose the internal audit reports to the shareholders in the AGM while only 9 per cent of the banks disclose their board audit committee's report publicly. When it came to disclosing performance to the depositors only the foreign banks came with a positive answer while no public and local private banks appear to be doing so.
The survey noticed that except for the foreign banks no local bank has any corporate by-law or practice of disclosing connected/insider lending in any sorts of the reports nor do they reveal methods to determine the salaries and benefits of the executives. And survey information reveals that only the foreign banks along with one local private bank are required by their corporate by-laws to reveal information on third party transactions 9 . And more surprisingly it has been found in the survey that except for one public sector and one local private sector banks no other banks have board committees on nomination and remuneration affairs making the those activities non-transparent.
In an ideal scenario any wrongdoing by shareholders or executives are supposed to be exposed if there remains an effective audit and disclosure system. From outside, the audit picture in 
Role of Central Bank, Other Regulators and Corporate Governance
The primary regulator for the banks in Bangladesh is the central bank, known as Bangladesh Defaulters often go to the court and win an injunction barring banks to sell the collaterals or calling them 'defaulter' until the case is solved. And a decade is a very common timeframe for courts to come up with verdicts. Again lack of sufficient legal personnel in Bangladesh is accountable for this problem. Altogether the regulatory authorities, particularly the central banks have failed the depositors and small shareholders in rendering its duty properly in terms of prudential regulation and supervision.
CONCLUSIONS
Banking sector remains of enormous importance for Bangladesh who is striving hard to strengthen its developing yet fragile economy. To move from the agriculture based economy to an industry-based one, Bangladesh needs its banking sector, which is the single largest element of the financial sector, to operate at its best with utmost efficiency. Anything short of that and even a slight instability in this area would wreck long term havoc on Bangladesh's development.
And sound corporate governance remains to be a key requirement for efficient and stable banking system. We have discussed in this paper how uniqueness of banking companies and banking business require special corporate governance attention on a priority basis particularly for the developing countries where prudential regulation and supervision is inadequate to provide a safety net for the depositors and stakeholders of the banks.
In In order to restore discipline and bring sound corporate governance the first priority is to keep the system out of political influence. The political considerations/influence reigns supreme in Bangladesh banking from running the public sector bank to issuing private bank licenses and from interfering with the central bank to protecting bank defaulters. Banks and regulators need total autonomy and must be allowed to deal with banking issues in terms of economic and commercial viability. The central bank must be given the freedom of acting on behalf of the depositors. However the central bank needs to restructure it self with better monitoring techniques, use of technology and improve the quality and accountability of its own human resources.
The preferential treatment of 'Sponsor' shareholders is creating a large chunk of the problems in the local private banks. Equal treatment and rights of all shareholders would bring about much positive disciplinary change in the banks. The banks in Bangladesh are still closely held companies. Releasing more shares to public and particularly to institutional investors should be encouraged as it will bring about market-driven and closer monitoring of bank activities.
Prudential regulation should be designed taking into account the audit and disclosure problems that make much of the baking decisions non-transparent. The central bank should work closely with the other regulators such as ICAB to make improvements in the audit and disclosure practices of the banks without which good governance will be difficult to achieve. Had these issues been considered more than 20 years ago when government started to liberalize the banking sector, the sector could have avoided many of the underlying problems and losses it is burdened with today. In other words the issue of corporate governance of financial institutions must get due importance along with the decision of financial liberalization or else liberalization would only add to the woes of thousands of depositors along with inefficient banking system.
